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RECONSIDERING THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S PROXIMATE
CAUSE STANDARD FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION: PRECLUDING THE
"GLOBALIZATION" THEORY TO PROMOTE
GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT
Michelle A. Wyant *
ABSTRACT
As businesses expanded with the rise of globalization, so did
the effects of anticompetitive activity and, in turn, the reach of the
U.S. antitrust laws. Though Congress addressed the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the U.S. antitrust laws with its implementation of the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act ("FTAIA"), the statute only
created a three-way circuit split that led the Supreme Court to address
the issue and determine that the foreign injury must arise from both
foreign anticompetitive activity and the activity's adverse effects on
domestic commerce. The D.C. Circuit further clarified the issue on re-
mand by requiring a proximate cause relationship between the foreign
injury and adverse effects on domestic commerce. However, the com-
mentary speculated that the Supreme Court had only generated fur-
ther confusion.
This article enters the discourse to assert that the D.C. Circuit
has prevailed as the authority on the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
U.S. antitrust laws and should continue to prevail because it accords
with the FTAIA's language and legislative history, traditional anti-
trust principles, and Supreme Court opinions. More significantly, this
article reconciles the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard with
opinions both before and after it to reveal that (1) proximate cause
requires that the claimant's injury stem from participation in domestic
commerce adversely affected by the foreign conduct, and (2) this re-
quirement precludes foreign claimants from asserting claims based
solely on the effects of globalization. As such, the D.C. Circuit's proxi-
mate cause standard not only prevents U.S. courts from acting as
world courts but also promotes cooperation among the world's authori-
ties to combat anticompetitive activity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Shifting to Global Models
National boundaries no longer constrain businesses or the anti-
trust laws that govern their activities. "With rampant globalization,
instantaneous communication, and multinationals building products
with components from all over the world and selling them far from
where they are produced," national markets are not only difficult to
discern but may have given way to a single global market.' Though
globalization provides businesses with greater opportunities to capital-
ize on increased efficiency and economies of scale, the phenomenon
also creates greater opportunities for those businesses to engage in in-
ternational anticompetitive activity and injure parties on a global
scale.2 Businesses may have operated on a national scale at one point,
but when businesses shifted to a global model, so did the U.S. courts'
subject matter jurisdiction over their anticompetitive practices.
Subject matter jurisdiction inquiries shifted from a focus on lo-
cation of the anticompetitive conduct3 to the location of the conduct's
1 S. Lynn Diamond, Empagran, The FTAIA and Extraterritorial Effects: Guidance
to Courts Facing Questions of Antitrust Jurisdiction Still Lacking, 31 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 805, 809 (2006) (describing globalization).
2 Lacey M. Donovan, Importing Plaintiffs: The Extraterritorial Scope of the Sher-
man Act After Empagran, 91 IowA L. REV. 719, 722 (2006) (observing that
"[i]ncreased globalization creates greater opportunities for international cartel be-
havior and greater challenges for the U.S. in policing such cartels").
3 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (declining to assert
subject matter jurisdiction over foreign conduct based on its location and stating,
.what the defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica is not within the scope of the
[Sherman Act]").
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effects.4 This provided U.S. courts with subject matter jurisdiction
over foreign conduct as long as that conduct was intended to produce
adverse effects on the U.S. market.5 The shift paved the way not only
for the global application of U.S. antitrust laws but also for foreign
plaintiffs to take advantage of them. While foreign nations estab-
lished antitrust regimes throughout the world, the U.S. courts
emerged as the international forum of choice.6 Foreign plaintiffs had
always litigated claims against domestic defendants in U.S. courts,
but, with effects-based subject matter jurisdiction, foreign plaintiffs
began litigating claims against foreign defendants for foreign conduct
by basing claims on that conduct's adverse effects on the U.S. market.7
However, a uniform standard with which to evaluate the ef-
fects necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction over foreign con-
duct failed to emerge.' In 1982, Congress intervened and
implemented the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act ("FTAIA")
to clarify this very standard,9 but the FTAIA only led to a three-way
circuit court split in its interpretation.,o In F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd.
v. Empagran (Empagran I), the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
4 U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945) (establishing
the "effects test," which determines subject matter jurisdiction based on (1)
whether the conduct was intended to effect domestic commerce and (2) whether
the conduct actually did so) [hereinafter Alcoa]; accord H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 5
(1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490 (recognizing that since Alcoa,
"it has been relatively clear that it is the situs of the effects as opposed to the
conduct that determines whether U.S. antitrust law applies").
5 Id.
6 Spencer Weber Waller, The U.S. as Antitrust Courtroom to the World: Jurisdic-
tion and Standing Issues in Transnational Litigation, 14 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV.
523, 532 (2002) (identifying the advantages to suing in U.S. courts that are un-
available in foreign courts and make U.S. litigation both controversial and attrac-
tive to foreign plaintiffs).
7 Diamond, supra note 1, at 805.
8 H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 2, (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2487
(calling attention to the courts differing "in their expression" of the proper stan-
dard for subject matter jurisdiction over foreign transactions).
9 Id.
10 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 352 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(requiring that the foreign conduct give rise to "some private person or entity['s]"
claim as a result of the conduct's adverse domestic effects) [hereinafter Empagran];
Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PCL, 284 F.3d 384, 403 (2d Cir. 2002) (requiring only
that the foreign conduct affect domestic commerce); Den Norske States Oljesel-
skap As v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 427 (5th Cir. 2001) (requiring that the
foreign conduct adversely affect domestic commerce and that the adverse domestic
effects give rise to the plaintiffs claim, as opposed to any claim) [hereinafter Den
Norske].
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settle the dispute" but may have only provided clarification as to a
hypothetical situation' 2 - whether U.S. courts have subject matter ju-
risdiction over foreign plaintiffs whose injury arises from foreign an-
ticompetitive activity but is independent from the adverse effects on
the U.S. market. 3 The Supreme Court held that they do not and re-
manded the issue back to the D.C. Circuit to answer whether U.S.
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over foreign plaintiffs whose
injury arises from foreign anticompetitive activity and is dependent on
the adverse effects on the U.S. market. 4 In Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoff-
man-LaRoche, Ltd. (Empagran II), the D.C. Circuit held that U.S.
courts do have jurisdiction but only where the foreign conduct's ad-
verse domestic effects proximately caused the foreign injury.' 5
Commentators have speculated that the Supreme Court's re-
mand would result in another circuit split even after the D.C. Circuit
rendered its opinion.' 6 This article addresses these speculations and
enters the discourse to suggest the contrary and to assert that the D.C.
Circuit's standard has emerged as the prevailing opinion because the
opinions prior to the D.C. Circuit's decision are reconcilable with it,
and opinions after the D.C. Circuit's decision have followed it. Had the
commentary considered the D.C. Circuit's opinion in light of these
opinions, the analysis would have revealed that proximate cause re-
quires that the claimant's injury stem from participation in domestic
commerce adversely affected by the foreign conduct and, that as a re-
sult of this requirement, precludes foreign plaintiffs from asserting
claims based on the effects of globalization and basic market princi-
ples. Although the D.C. Circuit's opinion is not binding authority on
the other circuits, this article submits that its opinion is the authority
and should continue to prevail in light of the domestic participation
requirement for proximate cause accords with the FTAIA's language
and legislative history, traditional antitrust principles, and the Su-
preme Court's opinion. Moreover, precluding claims based on the ef-
fects of globalization not only constrains the U.S. courts' subject
matter jurisdiction in a manner that avoids the U.S. courts acting as
world courts but also promotes cooperation among the world's authori-
ties to combat the anticompetitive practices made possible by
globalization.
11 F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran (Empagran I), 542 U.S. 155, 160 (2004).
12 Diamond, supra note 1, at 829 (asserting that Empagran I did little to provide
guidance to lower courts).
13 Empagran 1, 542 U.S. at 159.
14 Id. at 175.
15 Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. (Empagran I/), 417 F.3d 1267,
1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
16 Diamond, supra note 1, at 829.
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B. The "Effects" of Expansion Raise Concerns
Enacted as a means to condemn trade restraints that "injuri-
ously affect" the U.S., 7 the Sherman Act of 1890 prohibits and defines
the liability for "[e]very contract, combination, . . .or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce, among the several states, or with for-
eign nations.""s While the United States could prosecute claims for
antitrust violations pursuant to the Sherman Act, the Sherman Act
did not provide individuals with the same ability.' 9 The Clayton Act of
1914 closed this gap by conveying standing in U.S. district courts for
individuals, "[w]henever the U.S. is hereafter injured" and set forth
the available remedies, including injunctive relief, treble damages plus
costs, and attorney's fees.2 °
Although the Sherman Act clearly applies to domestic com-
merce and commerce between the United States and foreign nations,
the Sherman Act's legislative history lends little guidance as to
whether the Sherman Act applies to strictly foreign commerce. 2 1 Con-
strued against its primary purpose, to protect U.S. commerce from
"evils resulting directly to consumers,"2 2 this lack of legislative gui-
dance suggests that the Sherman Act primarily regulates domestic
commerce. 23 Moreover, U.S. courts generally presume statutes do not
apply extraterritorially in the absence of clear legislative intent to the
contrary; 24 nevertheless, the reach of U.S. antitrust laws has been
expanded.
Initially, determinations concerning the extraterritorial reach
of U.S. antitrust laws focused solely on the alleged conduct's location.2 5
U.S. courts based subject matter jurisdiction on territorial princi-
ples. 26 The extraterritorial application of the U.S. antitrust laws was
17 Stephanie A. Casey, Balancing Deterrence, Comity Considerations, and Judi-
cial Efficiency: The Use of the D.C. Circuit's Proximate Cause Standard for Deter-
mining Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Antitrust Cases, 55 AM.
U. L. REV. 585, 590 (2005) (citing 21 Cong. Rec. 2454, 2456 (1890) (explaining that
one of the purposes of the Act was to create a federal cause of action redressing
anticompetitive harms)).
18 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §1 (2004).
19 Casey, supra note 17, at 591 (noting that the legislative history contains little
information regarding the application of that Act to foreign trade).
20 Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §15a (2000).
21 Casey, supra note 17 at 591.
22 Id. (citing 21 Cong. Rec. 2551, 2558 (1890) (statement of Senator Pugh)).
23 Id. (asserting that the lack of legislative guidance "indicat[es] that Congress
intended the Sherman Act to focus primarily on regulating domestic commerce").
24 Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 428 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 449 U.S. 244,
248 (1991)).
25 Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. 347.
26 Id.
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first addressed by the Supreme Court in America Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co.2 7 In this case United Fruit colluded with Costa Rican
authorities to obtain control of an American Banana plantation on for-
eign soil. The Supreme Court declined to assert subject matter juris-
diction over the foreign conduct.28
Though subject matter jurisdiction based on the conduct's loca-
tion prevailed for decades, this territorial-based notion of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction gave way to an effects-based notion of subject matter
jurisdiction with the advent of U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am. 29 In Al-
coa, Judge Learned Hand devised what later became known as the "ef-
fects test," where, if the foreign conduct was intended to affect
domestic commerce and that conduct actually did affect domestic com-
merce, the conduct fell under the U.S. courts' subject matter jurisdic-
tion.3" Although an international cartel fixed world aluminum prices
in violation of the Sherman Act and all of its conduct occurred in for-
eign territory, Judge Learned Hand found the court had subject mat-
ter jurisdiction because the defendants intended for their foreign
conduct to affect domestic commerce, which it did.3
Basing subject matter jurisdiction on "objective territorial prin-
ciple [s]" embraced by the "effects test" expanded the reach of U.S. anti-
trust laws to international cartel activities and business practices that
no longer operated within national boundaries.3 2 While the domestic
effects produced by foreign anticompetitive conduct "emerged as the
primary consideration" for determining the extraterritorial reach of
the U.S. antitrust laws, a definitive standard defining the domestic
effects required to justify subject matter jurisdiction over that conduct
did not.3 3
For lack of a definitive standard, U.S. courts could establish
subject matter jurisdiction over almost any anticompetitive activity
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Diamond, supra note 1 at 812; Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-444.
30 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
31 Id.
32 Diamond, supra note 1 at 812 (observing that as business practices began to
cross national borders, "international acceptance of the 'objective territorial princi-
ple'... establish[ing] the state's jurisdiction over crimes begun outside the state's
territory but which caus[el injury within it," grew).
33 Evan Malloy, Closing the Antitrust Door on Foreign Injuries: U.S. Jursidiction
Over Foreign Antirust Injuries in the Wake of Empagran, 38 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
395, 404 (2006) (noting that "[pirior to the FTAIA's enactment, courts were faced
with conflicting standards").
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conducted on an international scale.3 4 Judge Learned Hand formu-
lated his "effects test" with an intent element, but subsequent courts
"virtually ignored" it and "so devalued" the effects required to estab-
lish subject matter jurisdiction that "eventually anything more than a
de minimis effect on the U.S. market" sufficed.3 5 For example, in
Waldbaum v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., the district court required
that there simply be an anticompetitive effect in the United States,
while in Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anhauser-Busch, Inc., the dis-
trict court required that foreign conduct produce a direct effect on the
"flow of foreign commerce into or out of this country."36
Early on, commentators recognized that, with an increasingly
global economy, "anything that affects the external trade and com-
merce of the U.S. also affects the trade and commerce of other na-
tions."3 7 However, courts continued applying the domestic effect
requirement loosely to promote "Congress' foremost concern in passing
the antitrust laws ... the protection of Americans." These courts rea-
sons that suits by foreign plaintiffs benefited American consumers
with the "maximum deterrent effect of [the] treble damages" available
under the Clayton Act.38 Early courts promoting deterrence policies
reasoned that defendants would only continue violating antitrust laws
if foreign plaintiffs were precluded from asserting their claims, for the
benefits gained from engaging in anticompetitive activity outweighed
the potential cost in damages stemming from domestic plaintiffs
alone. 3
9
Aggressive extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws
ensued from the combination of effects-based subject matter jurisdic-
tion and treble damages. However, such stringent enforcement raised
concerns regarding both the potential impact on the courts and the
34 Waller, supra note 6 at 525 (indicating that of 249 subsequent foreign com-
merce actions filed in U.S. courts, none were dismissed for lack of effects on the
U.S. market).
35 Id.
36 Waldbaum v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,378
at 76, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anhauser-Busch, Inc., 383
F.Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
37 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 611 (9th Cir.
1976) (citing Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse, 65
YALE L.J. 1087, 1150 (1956)).
38 Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314-315 (1978).
39 Id. at 315 ("If foreign plaintiffs were not permitted to seek a remedy for their
antitrust injuries, persons doing business... might be tempted to enter into an-
ticompetitive conspiracies affecting American consumers in the expectation that
the illegal profits they could safely extort abroad would offset any liability to plain-
tiffs at home."); accord Kruman, 284 F.3d at 403 (2d Cir. 2002).
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mounting international tension with our allies and trading partners.4 °
Allowing foreign plaintiffs to sue in U.S. courts "open[ed] [them] to
global claims on a scale never intended by Congress."4 Moreover, ex-
traterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws led to a series of
blocking statutes that greatly hindered the courts' discovery efforts.
4 2
These unnecessary international complexities brought about
by an unrestrained application of the "effects test" began to resonate
with the courts. As expressed in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America N.T. & S.A., federal courts could not legitimately exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over foreign conduct without "some effect or
intended effect on American foreign commerce." However, the effects
test alone was insufficient, for it failed to consider "whether American
authority should be asserted... as a matter of international comity
and fairness."4 3 The Timberlane court adopted a seven factor balanc-
ing test that took these matters into account,4 4 but the Timberlane
40 Clifford A. Jones, Exporting Antitrust Courtroons to the World: Private Enforce-
ment in a Global Market, 16 Loy. CONSUMER. L. REV. 409, 418-419 (2004); accord
Waller, supra note 6 at 525-526 ("The reaction of foreign governments ... created
the sense that the overall interest[s] of the U.S. were not being well served by this
all-out assault on anticompetitive behavior anywhere in worldwide commerce.").
41 Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 431.
42 Jones, supra note 40 at 418-419 (calling attention to blocking statutes imple-
mented in Ontario and Quebec in response to investigations in the Canadian pa-
per industry and the blocking statute implemented in the United Kingdom in
response to Uranium litigation); see also Waller supra note 6 at 525-526.
4 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
44 Id. at 614-15. The Timberlane court formulated the following balancing test:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties
and the locations or principal places of businesses or corpora-
tions, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be ex-
pected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects
on the U.S. as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to
which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American com-
merce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative impor-
tance to the violations charged of conduct within the U.S. as
compared with conduct abroad. A court evaluating these factors
should identify the potential degree of conflict if American au-
thority is asserted. A difference in law or policy is one likely sore
spot, though one which may not always be present. Nationality
is another; though foreign governments may have some concern
for the treatment of American citizens and business residing
there, they primarily care about their own nationals. Having as-
sessed the conflict, the court should then determine whether in
the face of it the contacts and interests of the U.S. are sufficient
to support the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
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court's approach to constraining subject matter jurisdiction with con-
siderations of international comity and fairness was not uniformly
adopted.45
Concerns regarding U.S. export activity also grew. Businesses
regarded the expansive application of U.S. antitrust laws as a handi-
cap "chilling export conduct in a way that was not the case in other
countries."4" In 1982, Congress acted and implemented the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvement Act ("FTAIA") to address the "business
perception" that the U.S. antitrust laws were impeding exporters and
to "clarify" the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts over foreign
antitrust injuries.47 The FTAIA first bars the application of the Sher-
man Act to claims regarding import trade or commerce with foreign
nations.48 Then, the statute provides a "domestic injury exception,"
which brings non-import conduct back within the provisions of the
Sherman Act if the conduct has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect" on either domestic commerce or U.S. export trade
and if the effect "gives rise to a claim" under the Sherman Act.4 9
Congress provided exporters with assurance that their an-
ticompetitive practices would not be condemned under the U.S. anti-
45 Waller, supra note 6 at 526 (observing that while the Ninth and Third Circuits
adopted the Timberlane test, the Seventh Circuit "emphatically rejected" it).
46 Id. at 530.
47 H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 4-5 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
2489-2490.
48 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2000)
[hereinafter FTAIA]. The FTAIA provides that sections 1 through 7 of the Sher-
man Act do not apply to "conduct involving trade or commerce [other than import
trade or import commerce] with foreign nations unless:"
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
seeable effect -
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce
with foreign nations, or on import trade or import com-
merce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations,
of persons engaged in such trade or commerce in the
U.S.; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sec-
tions 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section.
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because
of the operation of paragraph(1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this
title shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business
in the U.S..
Id.
49 Id; see also Casey, supra note 17 at 594 (simplifying the construction of the
FTAIA).
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trust laws as long as their activities did not affect the U.S. market.50
Congress enacted the antitrust laws to protect American commerce,
not foreign commerce. 1 If U.S. exporters engage in anticompetitive
practices that harm foreign markets and foreign consumers, "either it
is good for us,. . . none of our business, or at a minimum.., somebody
else's business will be negatively impacted."5 2 "To be sure," domestic
exporters are still subject to foreign antitrust laws, but Congress made
it clear that they are not subject to ours as long as they do not harm
our markets.5 3 While Congress did address concerns regarding export
activities, Congress did not address those regarding international com-
ity, nor did it provide courts with clear guidelines regarding subject
matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial claims.
Congress left comity to the courts, 54 and disagreement concern-
ing its proper role in determining subject matter jurisdiction over for-
eign conduct followed. In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,
the Supreme Court held that comity concerns were only relevant to the
determination if a "true conflict" between U.S. and foreign law ex-
isted.5 5 This holding greatly limited the extent to which U.S. courts
could take comity into consideration, for a "true conflict" existed only
where following the law of one nation necessitated breaking the law of
the other.5 6 However, the Supreme Court did not resolve the issue.
Some lower courts simply disregarded the opinion. 7 The Ninth Cir-
50 H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 8-10 (1982) as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
2493-2495 (stating that the FTAIA will send a "clear signal" to the export business
community that the U.S. antitrust laws do not apply to "wholly foreign" or "export
transactions" that do not adversely affect domestic commerce); see Waller, supra
note 6 at 530 (commenting that "Congress wanted to make clear a very simple
proposition - U.S. firms can engage in anticompetitive conduct that injures foreign
markets and foreign buyers.").
51 Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 314.
52 Waller, supra note 6 at 530.
53 H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 10 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
2495 ("If the foreign state in question has an antitrust regime, American-owned
firms must still comply, but no longer is there any possibility that,... such firms
will be subject to a different and perhaps stricter regimen of antitrust than their
competitors of foreign ownership.").
54 H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 13 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
2498 (indicating that the FTAIA "would have no effect on the courts' ability to
employ notions of comity . . . or otherwise to take account of the international
character of the transaction").
55 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (citing Societ6 Nationale
Industrielle Arospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 555
(1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
56 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799 (holding that a true conflict exists only where
"compliance with the laws of both countries is otherwise impossible").
57 Waller, supra note 6, at 528.
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cuit "pretended that Hartford Fire did not happen" and stated that
Timberlane should be followed, while a judge in the Southern District
of New York simply adopted the Supreme Court's wording and found
"so-called true conflicts in a way that suggests he never read Hartford
" 58Fire.
" S
Furthermore, though Congress provided the FTAIA to define
the courts' subject matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial claims, the
courts had to wrestle with the FTAIA's construction and myriad of
double and triple negatives before even discovering the ambiguity that
awaited them in untangling the proper interpretation of "a claim."
The proper interpretation of "a claim" led to a three-way circuit-split,5 9
exactly the opposite of what Congress had hoped for when it "formu-
late[d] a standard to be applied uniformly through the federal judicial
system."6 °
The issue centered on whether "a claim" should be read as "a"
claim, meaning any plaintiffs claim, or "the" claim, meaning this
plaintiffs claim. The Second Circuit broadly interpreted "a claim" and
required only that the prohibited conduct's effect on domestic com-
merce violate the Sherman Act, for violations of the Sherman Act are
predicated on the conduct rather than injury, suggesting that a plain-
tiff need not show his injury.6 1 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit narrowly
interpreted "a claim" and required that the domestic effect relate to
the plaintiffs specific injury, finding a mere "close relationship" be-
tween the two insufficient to establish a claim.6 2 Taking a moderate
approach, the D.C. Circuit required that a private person or entity suf-
fer an actual or threatened injury as a result of the Sherman Act viola-
tion's domestic effect.6 3
II. EMPAGRAN I & II
A. A Narrow Assumption Leaves Open a Wide Alternative
Prompted by the circuit-split, the Supreme Court granted certi-
ori in Empagran .64 Empagran I dealt with an antitrust class action
brought on behalf of foreign and domestic vitamin purchasers assert-
ing an international price-fixing conspiracy by manufacturers and dis-
58 Id.
59 Empagran 1, 315 F.3d at 352; Kruman, 284 F.3d at 400; Den Norske, 241 F.3d
at 427; see Malloy, supra note 19 at 405-06.
60 H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 6 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
2491.
61 Kruman, 284 F.3d at 400.
62 Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 427.
63 Empagran, 315 F.3d at 352.
64 Empagran 1, 542 U.S. at 160.
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tributors pursuant to the Sherman Act.6 5 The D.C. Circuit dismissed
the suit as to the foreign purchasers for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion.6 6 The Supreme Court "assumed" that the foreign conduct inde-
pendently caused the foreign injury, or rather, that "the [foreign]
conduct's domestic effects did not help bring about that foreign
injury. 6 7
With respect to the meaning of "a claim," the Supreme Court
removed itself from the circuit courts' linguistic debate quickly and fo-
cused its attention on other considerations. The plaintiffs read "a
claim" as any claim, and though the Supreme Court acknowledged it
as "the more natural reading," the Supreme Court observed that it also
"makes linguistic sense" to read the phrase as the claim at issue.68
The Supreme Court determined that reading "a claim" as the claim at
issue best accorded with the Congressional intent behind the FTAIA
and principles of prescriptive comity.
69
These considerations led the Supreme Court to ultimately hold
that the FTAIA precludes U.S. courts from exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign conduct that causes domestic injury but that
independently causes foreign injury.7 0 The Supreme Court first con-
sidered Congressional intent and observed that Congress specifically
excluded wholly foreign injury from the reach of the U.S. antitrust
laws in order to assure exporters that their business practices would
not be hindered by their enforcement. 7 ' Thus, Congress "designed the
FTAIA to clarify, perhaps to limit, but not to expand in any significant
way the Sherman Act's scope as applied to foreign commerce."72
The Supreme Court, then, applied principles of prescriptive
comity to define the scope of the Sherman Act.73 As a starting point,
the Supreme Court reiterated that courts construe ambiguous statutes
to avoid unreasonable interference with foreign nations' sovereign au-
thority.74 From that rule of construction, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that applying the U.S. antitrust laws to foreign harm that is
independent of any domestic harm may create conflicts between the
laws of different nations that would disrupt the harmony necessitated
by "today's highly interdependent commercial world."7 5 In light of this
65 Id. at 159.
66 Id. at 160.
67 Id. at 175.
8 Id. at 173-74.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 175.
71 Id. at 162.
72 Id. at 169 (emphasis omitted).
73 Id at 169.
74 Id. at 164.
75 Id. at 164-65.
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potential for conflict and interference with foreign nations' sovereign
authority, the Supreme Court found "the justification for that interfer-
ence seem[ed] insubstantial" when that foreign conduct did not pro-
duce domestic injury.7 6 Therefore, subject matter jurisdiction over
foreign conduct that produces independent foreign injury was
unreasonable.7 7
Such an exercise of subject matter jurisdiction would unjustifi-
ably risk replacing foreign antitrust regimes with our own. 7' The Su-
preme Court asked: "Why should American law supplant, for example,
Canada's or Great Britain's or Japan's own determination about how
best to protect Canadian or British or Japanese customers from an-
ticompetitive conduct engaged in significant part by Canadian or Brit-
ish or Japanese or other foreign companies?" 79 If subject matter
jurisdiction were permitted, foreign plaintiffs could sue on the basis of
any foreign anticompetitive conduct as long as that conduct produced
an adverse domestic effect effectively giving foreign plaintiffs their
choice between U.S. and foreign law.8 ° Though a "true conflict" as en-
visioned by the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire"' would not occur
where other nations have adopted antitrust laws similar to our own,
the Supreme Court drew attention to conflicts regarding the proper
remedy for injury, specifically treble damages.8 2 Allowing foreign
plaintiffs to take advantage of treble damages would undermine the
competing considerations, such as amnesty programs, that led foreign
authorities to decline permitting more generous remedies.8 3
Though the Supreme Court considered the deterrence argu-
ments surrounding treble damages and the detection arguments sur-
rounding the amnesty programs, it concluded that there was not
enough empirical evidence to outweigh considerations regarding Con-
gressional intent and principles of international comity.8" While
awarding treble damages to foreign plaintiffs may deter anticompeti-
tive activity by off-setting foreign profits,8" foreign profits could also
subsidize the potential losses resulting from treble damages.8 6 In ad-
76 Id. at 165.
77 Id. at 165-66.
78 Id at 166-67.
79 Id. at 165.
80 Id. at 166.
81 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798.
82 Empagram 1, 542 U.S. at 167.
83 Id. at 168.
84 Id. at 174-75.
85 H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 10 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
2495.
86 Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20, F. Hoffmann-
LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724).
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dition, these damages could prevent the initial detection of antitrust
violations by destroying amnesty-seeking incentives. s7 A violator
could lessen his criminal penalties by taking part in an amnesty pro-
gram; however, the potential liability resulting from global civil claims
could overshadow his incentive to seek amnesty and prevent whistle-
blowers from coming forward with information.
8 8
Furthermore, the Supreme Court determined that its holding
best relieved the burden imposed on the courts by unchecked subject
matter jurisdiction over foreign conduct. Motivated by concerns re-
garding the U.S. courts' burden in adjudicating the claims, the Su-
preme Court declined to adopt a case-by-case analysis with regard to
comity considerations.8 9 This approach would require courts to ex-
amine the manner with which foreign law, as compared to American
law, treats violations resulting in detailed procedures that would not
only delay proceedings but would also be unworkable for the courts.90
The Supreme Court concluded that applying American anti-
trust laws to foreign injury that is independent from domestic injury
caused by foreign conduct would be an "act of legal imperialism;"
therefore, comity concerns counsel against applying American anti-
trust laws to independent foreign injury, for while other nations may
be free to adopt our antitrust policies, they cannot be imposed.9 ' In
the age of globalization where, as the Supreme Court noted, busi-
nesses conduct their affairs in a "highly interdependent commercial
world,"9 2 it is hard to imagine an instance where foreign anticompeti-
tive conduct adversely affecting U.S. commerce would give rise to for-
eign injury that is wholly independent from adverse domestic effect. 93
However, the Supreme Court left open the issue of foreign injury that
is dependant on the adverse domestic effects and remanded the case
back to the D.C. Circuit to address the plaintiffs' alternative argument
of re-classifying the plaintiffs' injury as dependent injury
B. Proximate Cause Precludes the "Globalization" Theory
In Empagran II, the D.C. Circuit addressed the subject matter
jurisdiction question regarding dependent injury. The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the adverse effects of the defendant's foreign anticompetitive
conduct on the domestic market were the "but-for" cause of the plain-
87 Empagran 1, 542 U.S. at 168.
88 Brief for the United Sates as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
86, at 20.
89 Empagram 1, 542 U.S. at 168-69.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 169.
92 Id. at 165.
93 Id. at 159-60.
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tiffs harm.9 4 More specifically, the plaintiffs argued that, because the
plaintiffs' products were "fungible and globally marketed," the defend-
ants could not have maintained their international price-fixing scheme
without maintaining that scheme in the United States.9" Had the de-
fendants not maintained their price-fixing scheme in the United
States, overseas purchasers would have been able to purchase the
products at lower prices, either directly from the U.S. sellers, or from
those who imported the products from the United States.9 6 This po-
tential arbitrage would have prevented the defendants from selling
their products at super-competitive prices. 97 The plaintiffs' theory es-
sentially described business in the age of globalization. The plaintiffs'
claim was based on the market principles stemming therefrom. "Thus,
the super-competitive pricing in the U.S. 'gives rise to' the foreign
super-competitive prices from which the [plaintiffs] claim injury."9 8
Rejecting the plaintiffs' globalization theory, the D.C. Circuit
held that but-for causation between domestic effects and foreign injury
is "simply not sufficient" to bring anticompetitive foreign conduct
within the FTAIA exception for two reasons.9 9 One, FTAIA's lan-
guage, "gives rise to," suggests a direct causal relationship between
the domestic effects and the foreign injury as required by proximate
cause.'0 0 Two, reading the FTAIA to require a more expansive stan-
dard "open[s] the door to ... interference with other nations' preroga-
tive to safeguard their own citizens from anticompetitive behavior
within their own borders;" a proximate cause standard accords with
principles of prescriptive comity. 10 Adverse domestic effects that
merely "facilitate" the foreign injury do not establish proximate cause
because the foreign conduct is indirectly related to the adverse domes-
tic effects.1
0 2
III. THE AFTERMATH
A. The Discourse
After the Supreme Court decided Empagran I, scholars specu-
lated that the Court's decision to address only independent foreign in-
jury would give rise to another circuit split regarding claims based on
dependent foreign injury. The articles written after Empagran I
94 Empagran 11, 417 F.3d at 1270.
95 Id.
96 id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1270-71.
100 Id. at 1271.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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brought attention to the ambiguity inherent in deciding a "perhaps
only hypothetical, situation," and the manner with which plaintiffs
could "exploit" the ambiguity by reframing their claims to assert that
their injuries were dependent on adverse domestic effects. 103 Prior to
Empagran II, a potential circuit split led to a split in the commen-
tary. 10 4 Commentators arrived at opposite conclusions with regards to
whether U.S. courts should assert subject matter jurisdiction over de-
pendent injury. 10 5 Following Empagran II, commentators continued
to speculate that the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard would
not resolve the issue, noting that the D.C. Circuit is not binding au-
thority on the other circuits' 0 6 and that opinions prior to its ruling
reached a separate conclusion.'
0 7
Commentators suggested that while the D.C. Circuit's proxi-
mate cause standard may emerge as the predominate standard,10 8 a
split among the circuit courts had already been established. ° 9 The
103 Diamond, supra note 1, at 830.
'04 Malloy, supra note 33, at 427-28 (arguing that U.S. courts should not assert
subject matter jurisdiction over foreign conduct giving rise to foreign injury that is
dependent on adverse domestic effects though addressing the D.C. Circuit's proxi-
mate cause); Jodi Stanfield, Dependent Injury Based Claims: The Next Step in
American Regulation of Antitrust, 39 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1671 (2006) (arguing that
U.S. courts should assert subject matter jurisdiction over dependent foreign injury
as a means to implement further the policy objectives addressed by the Supreme
Court in Empagran I but not addressing the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Empagran
II).
105 Malloy, supra note 33, at 427-28; Stanfield, supra note 104.
106 Diamond, supra note 1, at 834.
107 Id. at 836 (asserting that "[i]f the Supreme Court intended a proximate cause
standard, a decision that got it wrong was In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust
Litigation."); see In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 2005 WL 1080790
(D. Minn. May 2, 2005) (Monosodium I) (exercising subject matter jurisdiction
where the plaintiffs claimed injury based on a world-wide MSG and nucleotides
price-fixing conspiracy that raised MSG and nucleotide prices in foreign
commerce).
108 Id. at 834; Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA & Empagran: What Next?, 58
SMU L. REV. 1419 (2005).
109 Cavanagh, supra note 108 at 1437-1440 (pointing to Sniado v. Bank Austria
AG, BHP New Zealand Ltd. v. UCAR Int'l, Inc., MM Global Servs., Inc. v. The Dow
Chem. Co., and Monosodium I as split decisions and criticizing the Monosodium I
court, remarking that "a court need not accept mere conclusory allegations"); Dia-
mond, supra note 1, at 834-836 (drawing attention to divergent standards in
Sniado v. Bank Austria, MM Global Servs., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., and
Monosodium I); Donovan supra note 2 (identifying MM Global Services, Inc. v.
Dow Chem. Co. (as an expansive standard & Empagran II as a moderate standard
for subject matter jurisdiction); see Empagran 11, 417 F.3d at 1267 (requiring prox-
imate cause to assert subject matter jurisdiction); see Sniado v. Bank Austria AG,
378 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004) (declining to assert subject matter jurisdiction where
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commentary endorsed the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard, 110
but failed to reconcile it with the prior opinion. Had the commentators
done so, the analysis would have revealed that proximate cause re-
quires that participation in domestic commerce be adversely affected
by foreign conduct for a plaintiff to assert injury. Considering the
opinions following Empagran I in light of this domestic participation
requirement reconciles the apparent circuit split and reveals that the
D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard has emerged as the rule of
law regarding U.S. courts' subject matter jurisdiction over foreign con-
duct, precluding plantiffs from asserting claims based on globalization
and basic market principles.
B. Proximate Cause Prevails & Requires Participation in Domestic
Commerce
Though speculation arose as to whether the Supreme Court's
independent effects test in Empagran I would give rise to another cir-
cuit split, the decisions prior to Empagran II are reconcilable with it,
and subsequent decisions have followed it. Thus, the D.C. Circuit's
proximate cause standard has emerged as the rule of law regarding
subject matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct. Further, rec-
onciling Empagran If with prior cases reveals that, in order to estab-
lish proximate cause, a plaintiff must assert that the defendant's
participation in domestic commerce gave rise to the plaintiffs harm.
While the courts ruled somewhat inconsistently with respect to
dependent claims prior to Empagran II, the decisions are reconcilable
plaintiff asserted a worldwide exchange rate fixing scheme but did not character-
ize the scheme as even a but-for cause of his injury); BPH New Zealand Ltd. v.
UCAR Int'l, Inc., 2004-2 Trade Cases P 74,503 (3rd Cir. 2004) (remanded);
Monosodium I, 2005 WL 1080790 (asserting jurisdiction where the plaintiff al-
leged injury resulting from international MSG and nucleotide price-fixing
scheme); MM Global Servs., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 329 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D. Conn.
2004) (asserting subject matter jurisdiction where defendants allegedly compelled
the plaintiffs to engage in a worldwide price-fixing conspiracy that inhibited plain-
tiffs ability to sell and resell the defendant's products in the United States).
110 Casey, supra note 17 (arguing that considerations of prescriptive comity and
judicial efficiency should take precedence over deterrence considerations); Makan
Delrahim, Drawing the Boundaries of the Sherman Act: Recent Developments in
the Application of the Antitrust Laws to Foreign Conduct, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 415 (2005) (asserting that the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard ac-
cords with the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice's understand-
ing of the U.S. courts subject matter jurisdiction over foreign conduct); Kevin
O'Malley, Does U.S. Antitrust Jurisdiction Extend to Claims of Independent/De-
pendent Foreign Injury, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 219 (2006) (endorsing the
D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard and advocating a case-by-case
determination).
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with the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard. After Empagran I,
plaintiffs asserted the globalization theory in order to take advantage
of the argument left open by the Supreme Court: that the foreign in-
jury caused by foreign conduct was dependant on domestic injury.
Sniado v. Bank Austria AG was the first case in which the plaintiff
asserted the globalization theory after Empagran I and the Second
Circuit promptly dismissed it."' In Sniado, a traveler asserted that
he was paying excessive and "supra-competitive" currency exchange
fees and that these fees were the result of a price-fixing conspiracy.
1 12
Though the plaintiff failed to assert that adverse effects in the United
States were a "but-for" cause of his injury, he did request that the
court infer that "the domestic component" of the alleged "'worldwide
conspiracy' was necessary.., for the conspiracy's overall success" and
that his injury was, therefore, dependent on adverse domestic ef-
fects. 1 3 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit found the allegations insuf-
ficient to establish jurisdiction." 4 Though the Second Circuit did not
require a proximate cause standard, its decision to reject "but-for" cau-
sation as a sufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction is in line
with the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Empagran 11.
MM Global Services, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co. is the only case
since Empagran I in which a court has exercised subject matter juris-
diction over a foreign plaintiffs injury based on adverse domestic ef-
fects. "' In MM Global, the plaintiffs, certain foreign chemical
distributors, asserted that the defendants compelled them to agree to
take part in a global price-fixing conspiracy. The complaint alleged
that the defendants threatened to refuse to sell products from the
United States to the plaintiffs unless the plaintiffs maintained certain
resale prices in India." 6 The plaintiffs alleged that their injury, sus-
tained in India, was based on improperly diminished and restrained
competition in the domestic sale of the defendants' product. 1 7 The
court held that jurisdiction was proper because the defendant's foreign
conduct caused the adverse domestic effects, which then gave rise to
the plaintiffs foreign injury. 118
Following MM Global, in In re Monosodium Glutamate Anti-
trust Litigation, the District Court of Minnesota also exercised subject
matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff asserted the globalization the-
... Sniado, 378 F.3d 210.
112 See id., 378 F.3d at 212.
113 Id. at 213.
114 See id.
115 MM Global, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 337.
116 See id. at 340.
117 Id.
"" See id. at 342.
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ory, 1 9 but later reconsidered its decision.12 ° The court's initial deci-
sion noted that the plaintiffs "craftily plead" the alternative theory
recognized in Empagran I and, accordingly, maintained subject matter
jurisdiction over the case.1 2 ' Because the plaintiffs alleged dependent
rather than independent harm, the policy considerations counseling
against subject matter jurisdiction in Empagran I were not present. 122
The Monosodium I court found that: (1) comity concerns were irrele-
vant to subject matter jurisdiction determinations regarding depen-
dent foreign harm;123 (2) permitting foreign plaintiffs to sue was
necessary to deter international anticompetitive conduct;' 2 4 and (3)
because Congress intended to apply the Sherman Act to international
cartel activity that affected domestic commerce, "[any major activities
on an international cartel would likely have the requisite impact ... to
trigger ... subject matter jurisdiction.' 25
Following the D.C. Circuit's decision in Empagran 1I, the Dis-
trict Court of Minnesota agreed to reconsider its decision in
Monosodium I and subsequently dismissed the action for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. 12 6 On reconsideration, the Monosodium 1I
court adopted the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard, finding
that "[t]he global price-fixing cartel theory establishes only an indirect
relationship" between the adverse domestic effects and foreign injury,
not proximate cause.
1 2 7
Although the District Court of Connecticut's decision in MM
Global to exercise subject matter jurisdiction may seem at odds with
Empagran H, it has since been reconciled with the D.C. Circuit's proxi-
mate cause standard. As noted in eMag Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo
Corp., the MM Global court did not address whether "but-for" causa-
tion is sufficient to assert subject matter jurisdiction over foreign
claims under the FTAIA. 12 ' Further, the plaintiffs in MM Global
plead direct participation in domestic commerce in addition to injury
resulting from the adverse domestic effects brought about by a global
119 Monosodium I.
120 In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig. (Monosodium I), 2005 WL
2810682 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2005).
121 See Monosodium I, 2005 WL 1080790, at *8.
122 See id. at *6.
123 See id.
124 See id. at *7.
125 Id. at *6.
126 See id. at *4.
127 Id. at *3.
128 eMag Solutions LLC v. Toda Kogyo Corp., id. 2005 WL 1712084, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. July 20, 2005).
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price-fixing conspiracy, 12 9 whereas the plaintiffs in the cases following
Empagran II plead a global price-fixing conspiracy alone, basing their
dependant harm on the effects of globalization.
130
The plaintiffs' participation in domestic commerce distin-
guishes MM Global from the line of cases following Empagran I. The
plaintiffs in MM Global participated in both U.S. and foreign com-
merce by purchasing products in the United States and reselling them
in India, whereas the plaintiffs in the cases following Empagran II
participated in solely foreign commerce. The MM Global plaintiffs'
participation in U.S. commerce was adversely affected by the defen-
dant's global price-fixing scheme. The MM Global plaintiffs' foreign
injury arose directly from the adverse domestic effects, thus meeting
the Empagran II proximate cause standard.
Reconciling MM Global with Empagran II and the cases follow-
ing it reveals that in order to satisfy the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause
standard a plaintiff must allege that his foreign injury arose from par-
ticipation in domestic commerce adversely affected by the defendant's
foreign conduct. Where plaintiffs did not participate in U.S. com-
merce, and instead relied on global market principles in order to assert
injury based on adverse domestic effects, courts have found only an
indirect causal relationship.1 3 1 The causal relationship between ad-
verse domestic effects caused by foreign conduct and the foreign in-
jury, without participation in domestic commerce is, at best, a "by-
129 See Latino Quimica-Amtex v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., No. 03 Civ. 10312, 2005
WL 2207017, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2005).
130 In In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., Latino, and eMag,
the plaintiffs alleged only super-competitive prices in U.S. as a result of a global
price-fixing conspiracy resulted in the plaintiffs paying higher prices in foreign
commerce. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., No. C 02-1486,
2006 WL 515629 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2006) (where plaintiffs asserted international
price fixing as part of an international monopolization claim); Latino, 2005 WL
2207017; eMag, 2005 WL 1712084. In Advanced Micro Devices. Inc. v. Intel Corp.,
AMD asserted injury to its German subsidiary resulted in its lost income; how-
ever, reduced income flow is not participation in U.S. commerce, and U.S. courts
do not recognize reduced income flow as a direct domestic effect or injury. Ad-
vanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (Intel), 452 F. Supp. 2d 555, 561 (D. Del.
2006) (citing Info. Res., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Optimum S.A. v. Legent Corp., 926 F. Supp. 530, 533 (W.D. Pa.
1996)). In CSR Ltd. v. Cigna Corp., the plaintiffs alleged higher prices paid for
asbestos-related insurance coverage as a result of an Australian group boycott and
argued this boycott effected the market for coverage of U.S. risks. However, the
district court observed that an asbestos insurance coverage market does not exist
in the U.S. CSR Ltd. v. Cigna Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 526, 540-41 (D.N.J. 2005).
131 See Intel, 452 F. Supp. 2d 555, CSR, 405 F. Supp. 2d 526; Legent, 926 F. Supp.
530; Dynamic, 2006, WL 515629; Latino, 2005 WL 2207017; eMag, 2005 WL
1712084.
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product of a number of factors relevant to market conditions and the
like," i.e. globalization. 13 2 Plaintiffs alleging the globalization theory
"rely on general market principles to allege that, in a global market,
the effect of anticompetitive conduct in one location (i.e. the U.S.), will
cause a ripple effect that will necessarily 'be felt' in others."'3 3 This
causal link is too indirect to support subject matter jurisdiction,13 1 for
"no persuasive authority" supports the proposition that a "global price-
fixing conspiracy sufficiently alleges causation - and a claim under the
FTAIA-post Empagran I & I." 1 5 The globalization theory asserts no
more than "but-for" causation and establishes only an indirect rela-
tionship predicated on market principles, 136 which cannot pass muster
under the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause analysis.
The D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard has emerged as
the standard for determining subject matter jurisdiction over extrater-
ritorial antitrust claims. This has been shown in three ways. First,
courts require "extraordinary circumstances,"' 3 7 such as "an interven-
ing change of law,"1 38 to reconsider decided issues. The fact that the
Monosodium II court reconsidered its earlier decision suggests that
courts recognize the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard as the
law, demonstrating the weight of Empagran I!s authority. Second,
although the MM Global court reached a different outcome than Em-
pagran II, the two cases can be reconciled. In any event, MM Global
reveals that proximate cause requires participation in domestic com-
merce. Third, since Empagran II, not a single court has maintained
subject matter jurisdiction over foreign conduct where the plaintiff as-
serted injury based on the globalization theory.13 9
132 Intel, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
133 Latino, 2005 WL 2207017, at *13.
134 Id.
135 Dynamic, 2006 WL 515629, at *5.
136 Monosodium 11, 2005 WL 2810692, at *3.
137 Id. at *2 (citing Conrad v. Davis, 120 F.3d 92, 95 (8th Cir. 1997)).
138 Id. (citing Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., 48 F. Supp. 2d 885, 888 (D.
Minn. 1999)).
139 Intel, 452 F. Supp. 2d 555 (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
where the plaintiffs asserted an injury based on a worldwide monopolization claim
that included allegations of international price-fixing); Dynamic, 2006 WL 515629
(declining to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a global DRAM price-fixing
conspiracy); CSR, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 526 (declining subject matter jurisdiction
where plaintiffs alleged injury based on an Australian group boycott that raised
asbestos-related insurance coverage by restricting the plaintiffs' ability to obtain
alternative coverage in the United States from a U.S. subsidiary even though the
plaintiffs stressed that the coverage at issue was global and included risks in the
United States); Monosodium 11, 2005 WL 2810692 (reconsidering and reversing its
former decision to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over an alleged MSG and
nucleotide global price-fixing and market allocation scheme); Latino, 2005 WL
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The recent opinion from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
In re Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litigation v. UCAR Int'l., Inc., con-
firms this analysis. 14 0 In that case, a Saudi Arabian corporation pur-
chased graphite electrodes in the foreign market and, like many
plaintiffs before it, alleged injury based on a worldwide price-fixing
conspiracy that artificially inflated the electrode prices. 14 1 Unsurpris-
ingly, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the corporation's
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 142 Participation in domes-
tic commerce adversely affected by foreign conduct did not give rise to
the corporation's foreign injury. It neither purchased the electrodes in
domestic commerce nor asserted that the prices it paid for them were
set in the United States. 143 The Graphite court distinguished MM
Global on the grounds that it "did not involve the wholly-foreign trans-
actions at issue here,"'44 and explicitly followed the D.C. Circuit's
judgment in Empagran II. 145 Therefore, the D.C. Circuit's opinion is
clearly the authority on subject matter jurisdiction over extraterrito-
rial antitrust claims, precluding plaintiffs from asserting the global-
ization theory.
C. Courts Should Continue to Require Proximate Cause
Although "the D.C. Circuit is not, after all, the Supreme
Court,"' 4 6 courts should nevertheless recognize its opinion as the au-
thority on subject matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial jurisdiction,
for the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard accords with the
2207017 (dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiffs as-
serted that the defendants agreed to allocate the markets for and fix the prices of
chemicals incorporated into food, pharmaceutical, herbicide and plastic additives
on a global scale); eMag, 2005 WL 1712084 (declining to assert subject matter ju-
risdiction where plaintiffs alleged that the defendants engaged in a worldwide
magnetic iron oxide price-fixing conspiracy that injured the plaintiffs through
higher purchase prices in foreign commerce).
140 2007 WL 137684 (E.D. Pa.) (slip opinion).
141 Id. at *1.
142 Id. at *6.
143 Id. at *4.
144 Id. at *6 (noting that it "did not involve the wholly-foreign transactions at is-
sue here").
145 Id. at *5-6 ("Empagran II is logical as a matter of statutory interpretation and
follows from the Supreme Court's discussion of the importance of 'prescriptive
comity' in Empagran I." The court "will follow the reasoning set forth in Em-
pagran I and Empagran I and the district opinions following them.") (These opin-
ions include: Intel, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 555; Dynamic, 2006 WL 515629;
Monosodium 11, 2005 WL 2810682; Latino, 2005 WL 2207017; eMag, 2005 WL
1712084).
146 Diamond, supra note 1, at 834.
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FTAIA's language and legislative history, traditional antitrust princi-
ples, and the Supreme Court's opinion in Empagran I. With regard to
the language and history of the FTAIA, the D.C. Circuit's proximate
cause standard accords with the distinction between "with" and
"among" embedded in the phrase "trade or commerce with foreign na-
tions." Further, Empagran II most sensibly applies the requirements
that the conduct have a "direct, substantial and foreseeable effect,"
and that this effect give rise to the claim. The provision refers to con-
duct involving "trade or commerce with foreign nations,"147 which may
be distinguished from commerce between or among foreign nations.' 48
"[T]rade or commerce with foreign nations" suggests subject matter ju-
risdiction requires participation in U.S. commerce.149 Trade or com-
merce "between" or "among" foreign nations would suggest the
contrary and permit subject matter jurisdiction over wholly foreign
transactions.' 5 0 This, however, is not in accord with the statutory
language.
Congress does not have the authority to regulate wholly foreign
commerce. The Commerce clause grants Congress the power "to regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations," as opposed to "between" or
"among" foreign nations.1 5 ' The D.C. Circuit's proximate cause stan-
dard ensures that only plaintiffs who participate in domestic com-
merce can assert claims over foreign conduct in U.S. courts, preventing
the expansion of subject matter jurisdiction over foreign conduct be-
yond the purview of Congress.
Moreover, the "most sensible interpretation" of the require-
ment that conduct have a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foresee-
able effect" 5 2 is as a "synonym for proximate cause."' 53 This language
reflects the traditional proximate cause definition provided by tort
law.15 4 Proximate cause requires a direct link between the conduct
147 FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
148 See Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 426.
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 See id. at 426 n.18 (noting that "even if Congress indeed intended to regulate
purely foreign commerce with the Sherman Act, it was not empowered to do so
under the Commerce Clause.")
152 FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a)(1) (2000).
153 Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't of
Justice, Perspectives on International Antitrust Enforcement: Recent Legal Devel-
opments and Policy Implications, Address Before the American Bar Association
Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum 2, 11 (Nov. 18, 2003), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/201509.pdf.
154 Casey, supra note 17, at 509 n.129 (citing DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 182 (2001); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 42 (5th ed.
1984) (concluding the FTAIA is "indicative of proximate cause standards")).
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and the harm-the conduct be a substantial factor giving rise to the
harm, and the manner by which the harm occurred must be foresee-
able.'5 5 Lastly, as noted by the D.C. Circuit, "gives rise to" suggests
that the provision requires a "direct causal relationship, that is, proxi-
mate causation," which cannot be satisfied with "a mere but-for
'nexus."1 56
Though language takes priority over legislative history in con-
sidering a statute's construction,' 5 7 the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause
standard accords with the FTAIA's legislative history as well. Pursu-
ant to its primary concern, domestic commerce, 158 Congress imple-
mented the FTAIA to "exempt from the Sherman Act export
transactions that did not injure the U.S. economy."' 5 9 Through ex-
empting these transactions, Congress intended to promote American
exports by assuring domestic exporters the ability to participate in ef-
ficient joint ventures without incurring liability under the antitrust
laws of the United States, so long as those ventures did not harm do-
mestic commerce. 160 This assurance allows U.S. exporters to better
compete with foreign competitors by giving U.S. exporters the latitude
to engage in anticompetitive conduct abroad as long as that conduct
adversely affects foreign commerce alone.' 6 ' Congress implemented
"the optimal antitrust policy," for the FTAIA permits U.S. exporters to
engage in anticompetitive conduct to increase profits when "the wel-
fare loss from the U.S. national perspective is zero."' 6 2
The D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard implements this
policy by excluding claims based on global market principles rather
than participation in domestic commerce from the U.S. courts' subject
155 Id.
156 Empagran 11, 417 F.3d at 1271.
157 Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 425-26.
158 See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 314.
159 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 n.23.
160 H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 10 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
2495 (expressing the intention to "[free] American-owned firms that operate en-
tirely abroad or in U.S. export trade" from liability under the U.S. antitrust laws
where "their activities lack the requisite domestic effects," i.e. where their activi-
ties do not adversely affect domestic commerce).
161 H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 9-10 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
2494-95 (addressing the business perception that the U.S. antitrust laws impeded
U.S. exporters' ability to compete in foreign markets).
162 Note, A Most Private Remedy: Foreign Party Suits and the U.S. Antitrust
Laws, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2122, 2143 (2001) (reasoning from the following two
premises: (1) anticompetitive conduct in the context of export commerce poses a
far greater risk to competition in the U.S. than anticompetitive conduct in the
context of import commerce and (2) trade restraints in export commerce generally
harm foreign consumers, not domestic consumers).
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matter jurisdiction. 16 3 If U.S. exporters engaged in anticompetitive
activity abroad, and plaintiffs could assert claims based on market
principles stemming from globalization, these prospective plaintiffs
could tie their foreign injuries to some remote adverse affect on U.S.
commerce based on economic theory rather than the exporters' actual
conduct. Such a result would undermine Congress' purpose in imple-
menting both U.S. antitrust laws and the FTAIA.
The D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard protects U.S. ex-
porters from such claims and gives effect to a lexical priority rule or-
dering Congress' concerns: (1) protect U.S. commerce and (2) where
U.S. commerce remains unharmed, protect U.S. exporters.16 ' Thus, if
a U.S. exporter's anticompetitive activity injures a foreign plaintiff
while participating in U.S. commerce, that foreign plaintiff may bring
a claim under the U.S. antitrust laws, for permitting such a claim pro-
tects U.S. commerce. However, where a U.S. exporter's anticompeti-
tive activity injures a foreign plaintiff while participating in wholly
foreign commerce, that foreign plaintiff may not bring a claim under
the U.S. antitrust laws, for the conduct does not harm U.S. commerce;
therefore, the U.S. exporter is entitled to protection.
While Congress intended to extend the same protection of our
antitrust laws to domestic and foreign participants in U.S. com-
merce, 6 5 Congress' "foremost concern" in implementing the U.S. anti-
trust laws was the protection of domestic commerce.' 66 Congress
never intended for this protection to extend to plaintiffs claiming in-
jury arising from their participation in wholly foreign commerce.
American antitrust laws do not regulate foreign commerce; they regu-
late domestic commerce.' 67 Therefore, courts "should not impute to
Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct
which has no consequences within the U.S."' 68 The D.C. Circuit's
proximate cause standard achieves this balance in accordance with
these traditional antitrust principles, for a plaintiff must assert partic-
ipation in domestic commerce to establish that his or her foreign injury
arose directly from the adverse domestic effects brought about by for-
eign conduct. This participation in domestic commerce ensures that
the U.S. antitrust laws protect foreign and domestic participants in
163 See Empagran 11, 417 F.3d at 1271.
164 See id.
165 H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 10 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
2495 (stating that '[floreign purchasers should enjoy the protection of our anti-
trust laws in the domestic marketplace, just as our citizens do.").
166 Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 314.
167 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986)
("American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive conditions of other na-
tions' economies.") (citing Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443).
168 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
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domestic commerce, while excluding non-participants asserting claims
based on injuries with remote ties to domestic commerce.
Lastly, the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard comports
with the Supreme Court's opinion in Empagran I, for it respects inter-
national comity, reduces the burden on U.S. courts, and promotes har-
mony amongst antitrust authorities. The D.C. Circuit's proximate
cause standard gives effect to principles of international comity, in
that it limits subject matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial claims to
those cases in which the United States has an interest and excludes
claims that would best be determined in another forum.' 6 9 Because
proximate cause requires that the plaintiff participate in domestic
commerce in order to establish that his claim arose from adverse do-
mestic effects, the U.S. has an interest in adjudicating the claim, for it
arose out of participation in domestic commerce. Exercising subject
matter jurisdiction over claims based on the globalization theory per-
mits plaintiffs to seek redress for their injuries in U.S. courts "even if
those plaintiffs had no commercial relationship with any U.S. market
and their injuries were unrelated to the injuries suffered in the
U.S.,17o
If a plaintiff does not have a commercial relationship with the
United States, the United States has little interest in resolving his
claim and the claim would be more appropriately brought in another
forum. Entertaining such claims only contributes to the U.S. courts'
burden. Declining to follow the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause stan-
dard "effectively" provides for "worldwide subject matter jurisdiction to
any foreign suitor wishing to sue its own local supplier, but unhappy
with its own sovereign's provisions for private antitrust enforce-
ment."' 7 ' Refusing to assert subject matter jurisdiction over claims
based on indirect ties to U.S. commerce relieves U.S. courts from the
burden of adjudicating claims that would be more appropriately
brought in other forums. The D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard
prevents U.S. courts from asserting subject matter jurisdiction over
169 Casey, supra note 17, at 609; see Intel, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (declining to
assert subject matter jurisdiction over a worldwide monopolization claim where
plaintiffs had already filed claims in a number of foreign jurisdictions where the
alleged conduct had actually taken place).
170 Den Norske, 241 F.3d. at 427-28. This quotation suggests that the United
States does not have an interest in adjudicating claims asserted by plaintiffs lack-
ing a commercial relationship with the United States because, absent a commer-
cial relationship with the U.S., the injury incurred by the plaintiff does not affect
domestic commerce and, therefore, the U.S. does not have a financial stake in the
matter.
171 Empagran 1, 542 U.S. at 166.
HeinOnline -- 7 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus.  40 2008
2008] RECONSIDERING THE PROXIMATE CAUSE STANDARD 41
"marginal" claims' 7 2 that should be adjudicated in a forum with a
more direct stake in redressing the injury.
Thus, the proximate cause standard avoids overburdening U.S.
courts through respect for foreign nations' "prerogative to safeguard
their own citizens from anticompetitive activity."' 7 3 A less direct stan-
dard would only interfere with this prerogative' 7 4 by effectively sup-
planting foreign nations' antitrust schemes. 175 The D.C. Circuit's
proximate cause standard gives effect to the Supreme Court's concerns
regarding international comity. By precluding claims based on wholly
foreign commerce, the D.C. Circuit's standard ensures deference to for-
eign nations that have a direct interest in resolving the claim.
By respecting international comity concerns and deferring to
foreign nations with a significant interest in claims based on wholly
foreign commerce, the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard pro-
motes the "harmony particularly needed in today's highly interdepen-
dent commercial world." 17 6 While the Supreme Court did not find
that, "on balance," there was enough empirical evidence to determine
which side was "correct,"1 7 7 the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause stan-
dard balances the competing considerations surrounding the effect
treble damages have on deterrence, as well as participation in am-
nesty programs in a manner that facilitates cooperation among anti-
trust authorities.
The D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard maintains the de-
terrent effect of treble damages with respect to anticompetitive activ-
ity that affects domestic commerce to the extent that injury arises
from participation in our markets. However, awarding treble damages
awards has "generated considerable controversy"' and precipitated
blocking statutes passed to prevent the U.S. government from ob-
taining foreign discovery or enforcing U.S. judgments abroad.' 79 This
controversy stems from the manner with which those treble damages
undermine foreign authorities' enforcement policies, for awarding
these damages to foreign plaintiffs allows them "to bypass their own
less generous remedial schemes" and creates a disincentive to partici-
pate in foreign amnesty programs.1 80
172 Casey, supra note 17, at 609 (meaning claims based on remote ties to the U.S.).
173 Empagran II, 417 F.3d at 1271.
174 Id.
175 Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 161.
176 Id. at 164-65.
177 Id. at 174.
178 Id. at 167.
179 Delrahim, supra note 110, at 422; accord Jones, supra note 40, at 418-419;
Waller, supra note 6, at 525-526.
180 Empagran I, 542 U.S. at 167.
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Creating disincentives to participate in these programs hinders
exposing violations in the first place.' The D.C Circuit's proximate
cause standard removes this disincentive to the extent that the United
States does not have a significant interest in resolving the claim for
lack of participation in U.S. commerce. Proximate cause, therefore, re-
tains conspirators' incentive to participate in amnesty programs and
expose violations resulting in harm that stems from participation in
wholly foreign commerce and promotes the U.S. ability to enforce our
antitrust laws. Refusing to assert subject matter jurisdiction over
wholly foreign claims promotes the "cooperation and best efforts of for-
eign authorities" needed to enforce U.S. antitrust laws in the interna-
tional context by removing some of "the fear that the results of their
efforts will be applied in follow-on treble damages suits in U.S.
courts."" 2 The D.C. Circuit's proximate cause standard accords with
the FTAIA's language and legislative history, traditional antitrust
principles, and the Supreme Court's opinion in Empagran I. There-
fore, courts should continue to recognize it as the authority for subject
matter jurisdiction over foreign conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION: PROXIMATE CAUSE PROMOTES GLOBAL
ENFORCEMENT
The Supreme Court's decision in Empagran I interpreting the
FTAIA left open the question of whether U.S. courts had subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over foreign claims asserting injury that is dependant
on the adverse domestic effects brought about by foreign conduct. This
question gave rise to speculation that the decision would lead to an-
other split among the lower courts regarding subject matter jurisdic-
tion over foreign conduct. However, on reconsideration, the D.C.
Circuit's proximate cause standard has emerged as the prevailing
standard.
Though decisions prior to Empagran II may have differed in
their formulations of the standard, each decision reached a result that
is reconcilable with the D.C. Circuit's standard and each decision after
Empagran If has followed it. Reconciling the D.C. Circuit's proximate
cause standard with prior cases reveals that proximate cause requires
that claimants' participation in U.S. commerce adversely effected by
foreign conduct gives rise to their foreign injury and precludes claim-
ants from asserting claims based on global market principles. The
consensus following the opinion demonstrates the weight of the D.C.
181 Delrahim, supra note 110, at 423 (explaining that the prospect of unlimited
civil liability in U.S. courts deters antitrust violators from ever coming forward
and undermines amnesty programs' important role in the discovery of anticompe-
titive behavior in both the United States and abroad).
182 Id.
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Circuit's authority. The fact that one court reconsidered its prior opin-
ion in order to rule in accordance with the D.C. Circuit suggests that
courts recognize the opinion as the rule of law. Though the D.C. Cir-
cuit's opinion is not binding authority, courts should continue to follow
the opinion as if it were, for the D.C. Circuit's proximate cause stan-
dard accords with the FTAIA's language and legislative history, tradi-
tional antitrust principles, and the Supreme Court's opinion in
Empagran I.
In the age of globalization, we require global solutions to global
problems, including international cartels. The U.S. courts are not
"world courts" and should not act in that capacity. By honoring the
FTAIA's language and legislative history, traditional antitrust princi-
ples, and the Supreme Court's opinion in Empagran I, the D.C. Circuit
restrained the U.S. courts' subject matter jurisdiction in a manner
that preserves claims in which the United States has an interest in
resolving and dismisses those more appropriately brought in another
forum. Through deferring to other authorities, we do not lose our abil-
ity to adjudicate claims that have a significant effect on the welfare of
the U.S. economy. Instead, we gain the opportunity to cooperate with
foreign authorities in order to best adjudicate claims that have a sig-
nificant effect on the world economy.
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